The Law and Economics of International Sex Slavery: Prostitution Laws and Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation by Jakobsson, Niklas & Kotsadam, Andreas
 Department of Economics 
School of Business, Economics and Law at University of Gothenburg  
Vasagatan 1, PO Box 640, SE 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden  
+46 31 786 0000, +46 31 786 1326 (fax) 
www.handels.gu.se    info@handels.gu.se 
      
 
 
 
WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS 
 
               No 458 
 
 
 
 
         
               The Law and Economics  
              of International Sex Slavery: 
              Prostitution Laws and Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation         
                                                                           
          
Niklas Jakobsson  
Andreas Kotsadam 
 
 
 
        
 
               
          
                (June 2010)       
               Revised May 2013 
                 
                  
                
  
 
                 ISSN 1403-2473 (print) 
                  ISSN 1403-2465 (online) 
 1 
 
The Law and Economics of International Sex Slavery: 
Prostitution Laws and Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation 
 
Niklas Jakobssona and Andreas Kotsadamab* 
 
 
Abstract 
International trafficking in humans for sexual exploitation is an economic activity driven by profit 
motives, and up to four million people are estimated to be exploited by human traffickers each year. 
Laws regarding commercial sex influence the profitability of trafficking and may thus affect the 
inflow of trafficking to a country. Using two recent sources of European cross country data we show 
that trafficking of persons for commercial sexual exploitation (as proxied by the data sets we are 
using) is least prevalent in countries where prostitution is illegal, most prevalent in countries where 
prostitution is legalized, and in between in those countries where prostitution is legal but procuring 
illegal. Case studies of two countries (Norway and Sweden) that have criminalized buying sex 
support the possibility of a causal link from harsher prostitution laws to reduced trafficking. 
Although the data do not allow us to infer robust causal inference, the results suggest that 
criminalizing procuring, or going further and criminalizing buying and/or selling sex, may reduce the 
amount of trafficking to a country. 
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1. Introduction 
International human trafficking of women for commercial sexual exploitation (henceforth 
trafficking) has been identified as a form of modern-day slavery and it is a worldwide problem which 
has grown rapidly in the last decades (Bettio and Nandi 2010; Hodge and Leitz 2007). Up to four 
million people are estimated to be exploited by human traffickers each year (UNHCR 2006). 
According to the European Commission (2009) trafficking in human beings is a serious crime and a 
gross violation of human rights and to reduce trafficking in human beings is highly prioritized in 
many countries. 
 
Governments throughout the world view human trafficking as a component of organized crime and 
the average punishment is comparable to other types of serious transnational crimes (Morrison and 
Crosland 2001). It is also regarded as a crime against humanity in the statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Article 7.2). People are trafficked for the purpose of sexual or labour exploitation 
and it is estimated that 87 percent of trafficking is for sexual exploitation (UNODC 2006).1
 
 
Trafficking in human beings for sexual purposes is intimately linked to organized crime and is 
considered the second main source of illicit profits for organized crime (European Commission 
2009). In this study we investigate if there is a relation between national prostitution legislation and 
trafficking into a country. 
Trafficking is an economic activity in which organizations try to make profits (Salt 2000; Salt and 
Stein 1997). Traffickers will only sell persons for sexual exploitation when market conditions make it 
profitable (UNODC 2009). Evidence suggests that human traffickers belong to organized criminal 
organizations and that they act as businessmen trying to maximize profits (e.g. Anderson and 
O’Conell Davidson 2002; Hodge and Leitz 2007; Salt 2000; UNODC 2006; UNODC 2009). The 
profitability of trafficking to a given country hinges on the characteristics of that country’s market 
for commercial sex. A crucial factor for the profitability of commercial sex is the legal framework 
surrounding it. Aghatise (2004) argues that it is impossible to combat trafficking where prostitution is 
sanctioned. This is also the position taken by several governments and it has been an explicit 
motivation for criminalizing the buying of sex in Norway (Ot.prp. nr.48) and Sweden (Proposition 
                                                 
1 The figures regarding the share of sexual exploitation should be taken with care though, since sexual exploitation is 
arguably more visible than forced labor (UNODC 2009). 
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1997/98: 55) and the US government took a strong position against legalized prostitution using this 
argument (US Department of State 2004). Using the fact that national prostitution legislation differs 
considerably between countries, the aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis that harsher legislation 
surrounding commercial sex reduces the amount of trafficking to a country.  
 
The economics literature on prostitution is still sparse, although it has grown somewhat in recent 
years (e.g. Cameron et al. 1999; Edlund and Korn 2002; and Albert et al. 2007). Available studies 
have mainly focused on pricing, and more precisely on pricing as a reflection of risk preferences 
(Cameron and Collins 2003; Rao et al. 2003; Moffat and Peters 2004; Gertler et al. 2005; Levitt and 
Venkatesh 2007; and Raj and Shah 2008). Della Giusta (2010) further builds on the prostitution 
model of Della Giusta et al. (2008 and 2009) and incorporates the role of stigma and reputation for 
policy decisions. Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2011) study attitudes toward prostitution in the general 
population, and also investigate whether the recent criminalization of buying sex in Norway changed 
public attitudes (Jakobsson and Kotsadam 2010). 
 
The economics literature on trafficking for sexual exploitation is even sparser. Della Giusta et al. 
(2008) use survey data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Counter-
Trafficking Module Database, to study victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation. Of the 5,117 
females in the sample, 89 percent were trafficked for sexual exploitation. The countries of origin of 
these women were Eastern Europe and ex-Soviet states. Their salary before being trafficked was 
USD 52 per month; the amount they were being sold for was about USD 4,659 per month. Eighty-
four percent were recruited via personal contacts, TV and Internet advertising accounted for seven 
percent, five percent were kidnapped and one percent sold by their family. Also using the IOM data, 
Bettio and Nandi (2010) investigate which factors influence the violation of basic rights (physical 
integrity, free movement, access to medical care, the use of condoms, and the exercise of choice over 
sexual services) among trafficked women. They find that working location and country of work are 
the main determinants of rights enforcement, while individual and family characteristics play a 
marginal role. 
 
Furthermore, this paper relates to the broad literature on the economics of crime pioneered by 
Becker (1968). By prohibiting the market for a good the government raises the cost for suppliers and 
thus raises the price and lowers the quantity consumed (Becker et al. 2006). This is not always the 
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case, however, and Miron (2003) describes some of the mechanisms that may weaken this effect – 
namely, no regulation, no tax, no legal disputes etc. Miron and Zwiebel (1995) argue that, in the case 
of drugs, prohibition may lead to a significant decrease in drug consumption, but that it may also 
lead to increased violence, the establishment of black market cartels, and lower quality of the drugs 
supplied. Thus, the welfare effects of a prohibition policy are ambiguous when the quantity 
consumed decreases. This reasoning can also be applied to the case of prostitution and trafficking. 
That is, establishing what happens to the quantity of trafficking is not sufficient for evaluating the 
welfare consequences of a prohibition of prostitution. Hence, it should be clear that the aim of this 
paper is not to evaluate the total welfare effects of prostitution laws.    
 
There is one existing study which tries to evaluate the effect of national prostitution legislation on 
trafficking (Di Nicola et al. 2005). Examining official victim data from eleven EU countries, it argues 
that less harsh prostitution legislation may cause more trafficking victims. This conclusion is, 
however, drawn from a very small sample (11 countries) and from descriptive statistics. Danailova-
Trainor and Besler (2006) study what determines trafficking flows. Using country-level estimates of 
trafficking victim data they find that countries that are more open to globalization and countries with 
more prostitution are more likely to be destination places for trafficking victims. 
 
Using both the trafficking database constructed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
and data from the ILO, as well as information about national prostitution legislation, we investigate 
if there is a relation between prostitution legislation and the prevalence of trafficking to a country. In 
accordance with our theoretical predictions we find that the trafficking of women for commercial 
sexual exploitation is least prevalent in countries where prostitution is illegal, most prevalent in 
countries where prostitution is legalized, and in between in those countries where prostitution is legal 
but procuring illegal. However, these results should be regarded with care since the data is 
problematic in several ways (this is discussed thoroughly in later sections). To supplement the 
quantitative analysis we also investigate two cases of legal change and its effect on trafficking. The 
hypothesis of reduced trafficking from harsher laws is largely supported in these cases.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses human trafficking and 
prostitution. Section 3 presents the theoretical mechanisms. Section 4 describes the data and 
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descriptive statistics, while Section 5 considers the empirical framework and results. Section 6 
includes the case studies, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Human trafficking for sexual exploitation and prostitution 
Up to four million people are estimated to be exploited by human traffickers each year (UNHCR 
2006). Trafficking is intimately linked to organized crime and the United Nations estimate that 
criminal groups earn approximately seven billion US dollars a year on trade with people. According 
to the European Commission (2009), trafficking in human beings is a serious crime and a gross 
violation of human rights and combating it is a priority for many countries. It has been difficult to 
reach a consensus on how to define trafficking and it was not until 2000 that the UN General 
Assembly adopted a common definition, referred to as the Palermo Protocol, which defines 
trafficking as: “‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, 
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the 
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over 
another person, for the purpose of exploitation.”2
 
 In this paper we only consider trafficking for 
sexual exploitation and we link it to different policies on prostitution. 
Outshoorn (2004) created a typology for prostitution regimes which has been very influential in 
prostitution research (e.g. Della Guista et al. 2008). Abolitionism, prohibitionism, and regulation are 
identified as the three different policy regimes in connection to prostitution. Abolitionism refers to 
the position that prostitution should be banned by criminalizing third parties. Prohibitionism makes 
prostitution illegal and also the prostitute liable to penalties. Regulation refers to where prostitution is 
legal, with state intervention in the running of prostitution. This classification is the one we are using 
when constructing our measure of national prostitution legislation. A fourth regime, neo-
abolitionism, in which only the buyer is criminalized (as in Sweden, Norway, and Iceland), has been 
added to the typology (Iceland Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs 2009).  
 
Within feminist scholarship there is a division between those who see prostitution as harmful for a 
woman since she thereby contracts away freedom and sexuality, and those who see it as harmful 
                                                 
2 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 
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because society generates a stigma via the double standards of sexual morality (Shrange 2007). These 
two positions render different normative conclusions on the legal framework surrounding 
prostitution, where the second one may imply that criminalization further stigmatizes sellers. 
Outshoorn (2004) identifies the two major opposing position within this feminist debate, one 
viewing prostitution as “sexual domination and the essence of women’s oppression” and the other 
viewing it as work – “the sex-work position” (Outshoorn 2004: 9). These two positions are thought 
to lead to opposing policy aims; i.e., the first position wants criminalization of the third parties 
profiting from prostitution (prostitutes are seen as victims and thereby not liable), while the second 
calls for decriminalization. There are clear differences among countries in terms of the weights of 
these two positions in the prostitution discourse. In Europe, feminists in Germany and the 
Netherlands clearly favor the sex-work view, whereas Swedish feminists are generally found at the 
other end of the spectrum (Östergren 2006). 
 
Abolitionists and prohibitionists often dismiss claims of a distinction between “free” and “forced” 
prostitution and, since they view all prostitution as harmful, they have no special position in the 
debate on the links between prostitution and trafficking. Those favoring the sex-work view, who 
make a stark distinction on the basis of the degree of “choice” in prostitution, see criminalization of 
prostitution as bad but condemn trafficking. Although no position can be directly based on  
philosophical standpoints regarding the degree of choice, the two opposing views almost always end 
up arguing for different mechanisms in the trafficking chain and for different policy conclusions. The 
sex-work feminists argue that the lack of protection for sex sellers, induced by criminalization, leads 
to all kinds of exploitation, including trafficking. The solution, as they see it, is to regulate the sex 
market just like other markets. Prohibitionists, on the other hand, argue that measures against 
commercial sex are also measures against trafficking (Anderson and O’Conell Davidson 2002). This 
paper aims to fill in the gaps in the empirical evidence on which the two strands base their 
arguments. 
 
3. Theoretical mechanisms 
Following Danailova-Trainor and Belser (2006), we view trafficking as an exchange between 
recruiters and exploiters in an illicit market. A recruiter abducts (or recruits) a victim in a country of 
origin and sells her to a brothel owner in a destination country. To ease the presentation of the 
mechanisms we assume vertical integration so that recruiters and brothel owners operate within the 
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same business. Evidence suggests that human traffickers belong to organized criminal organizations 
and that they act as businessmen trying to maximize profits (e.g. Salt 2000; UNODC 2006; UNODC 
2009). Organized crime has as its major goal the maximization of profits and its success depends on 
there being exploitable markets (Morrison and Crosland 2001). We therefore argue that the decision 
made by a trafficker depends on the profit potential. The more profit that can be made in a specific 
country, the higher is the likelihood that a person will be trafficked to that country. As always, the 
profit is a function of revenues and costs. The revenues are a function of the price and the quantity 
sold and should therefore depend positively on the size of the market and the per capita income in 
the destination country. The costs for the trafficker can be divided into costs for entering a country, 
such as travel and smuggling costs, and costs for running the business once in the country, such as 
costly discretion etc. If the trafficker finds that the benefit exceeds the costs then trafficking to a 
country will take place. We focus on “demand” in destination countries, or, expressed another way, 
inflow of trafficking victims. We are interested in what determines which countries have high 
trafficking-victim prevalence. Why does demand differ among destination countries? 
 
Important factors for the traffickers’ revenues are the purchasing power and the size of the 
population in countries of destination. Large markets and customers with a high willingness to pay 
make it more profitable to exploit women in high income countries than in low income countries. 
 
Since deception of migrants is common and since there are fixed costs in establishing migration 
routes, we argue that increased immigration to a country reduces the costs of trafficking. With more 
immigration to a country, illegal activities are detected less frequently and the cost of trafficking 
women to that country is lower. However, as argued by Danailova-Trainor and Belser (2006), with 
more legal migration possibilities trafficking may actually decrease since those wishing to migrate 
may feel less compelled to deal with traffickers. 
 
Another important factor determining the costs is the ease or difficulty of setting up and running 
organized criminal activity. The legal framework surrounding prostitution is crucial since it affects 
the profit function. It is likely to affect the supply of trafficked women directly by increasing costs of 
the day-to-day prostitution since street prostitution is not viable. Laws criminalizing prostitution are 
likely to affect the demand for prostitution as well, especially if buying sex is illegal. A direct effect 
would be that people refrain from buying sex since they are afraid of getting caught. There might 
 8 
also be an important indirect effect working through the normative function of the law (Kotsadam 
and Jakobsson 2010, 2011). Prostitution laws affect the stigmatization of buying and selling sex, 
which influences the profit function. Della Giusta (2010) and Della Giusta et al. (2008) argue that 
policies that reduce the stigma associated with supplying sex would increase the marginal net gain of 
supplying prostitution and the marginal willingness to pay for it would rise. Policies that increase 
stigmatization of clients are expected to reduce the marginal willingness to pay, the quantity sold, and 
the equilibrium price. This framework leads us to expect that slacker prostitution laws lead to more 
trafficking for sexual exploitation. More specifically, we expect most trafficking to countries where 
prostitution is legal and regulated, least in the countries where buying and/or selling sex is illegal, and 
flows in between in countries where it is legal to buy and sell but illegal to profit as a third party 
(pimps or brothel owners).  
 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
The available data on trafficking is limited and unsatisfactory in many ways and we strongly 
encourage efforts to collect better data. To overcome some of the problems we use two different 
datasets with different merits and weaknesses. In this section we describe the datasets used as well as 
their limitations. We then proceed to describe our independent variables and how they relate to our 
trafficking measures. 
 
Our first dependent variable (Trafficking) captures the amount of trafficking to a country. It ranges 
from 1 for countries with a low inflow of trafficking to 5 for countries with a high inflow of 
trafficking. The data was constructed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and 
includes information from 113 institutions providing human trafficking information in 161 countries 
from 1996 to 2003 (UNDOC 2006). The institutions consist of governments, national criminal 
justice organizations, international police organizations, non-governmental organizations, research 
institutes, universities, news agencies, and newspapers. Twenty-four percent of these institutions 
were international, 26 percent were Western European, 14 percent North American, 13 percent 
Asian, while the rest came from other parts of the world. One of the main objectives of the database 
was to gather comparable data (Kangaspunta 2003). 
 
A content analysis of the publications by these institutions was made and 4,950 accounts of 
trafficking were found. If a country was referred to as a transit, origin or destination country, it was 
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recorded in the database and in this paper we focus on destination countries. If one organization 
referred to the same occasion several times it was only counted once. To minimize the problem of 
different organizations referring to the same instance of trafficking, efforts were made to refer to the 
primary source only. It is important to emphasize once again that the dataset counts occasions and 
not victims, so that a document finding one trafficking victim results in one citation in the database, 
as does a document that finds 300 victims. The citations for destination countries range between 0 
and 40. If a country got one (1) citation as destination country, it got the score Very low, 2-3 citations 
was recorded as Low, 4-10 Medium, 11-24 High, and 25-40 Very high. Thirty-nine European countries 
are included. Three countries score Very low, 4 Low, 16 Medium, 10 High, and 6 Very high. The 
countries are listed in Table A1 in the appendix. 
 
That a broad range of institutions was used as sources improves the data quality. Thirty-two percent 
of the data comes from international organizations, 27 percent from governmental organizations, 
and 18 percent from research institutions. We avoid using only official victim data. There are several 
problems with victim data, the most obvious being that countries with a lot of resources and good 
legal systems may detect a lot of trafficking even though the problem is not as severe as in other 
countries. For criminal data to be existent there must be law, the law enforcement agencies must care 
enough to act on the problem and be capable of doing so, there must then be a system of data 
collection and a willingness to provide the data to international organizations. Also, the legal 
definition of trafficking varies between countries; this may result in large differences in official 
records. 
 
We do not entirely overcome the bias existing in official data but it is somewhat alleviated by relying 
on several sources. Furthermore, by controlling for rule of law, GDP, and drug trafficking (for which 
data is more reliable) we are at least more confident that we capture the main trends in trafficking 
flows across countries. There are some additional problems with the data. It only uses sources in 
English, French, Spanish and German and 40 percent of the source institutions are in Western 
Europe or North America, which may create a bias. As argued in UNDOC (2006), the emphasis on 
Western source organizations may lead to a geographical bias. For this reason the analysis will be of 
European countries. In our European sample it is not necessary to control for laws against 
trafficking since such laws are in force in all countries but Estonia. Estonia, however, criminalized 
aspects of trafficking via related offences (UNODC 2009). It can also be argued that law 
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enforcement is quite similar in these countries, so that using the classification of legal regulation is 
actually meaningful for this sample. 
 
As a complement to the UNDOC data we also use a dataset constructed by Danailova-Trainor and 
Belser (2006) from ILO (International Labour Office) data. The database is constructed from 2,092 
reports containing quantitative information on trafficking during 1995–2004. Country-level estimates 
on trafficking victims for sexual exploitation are created by using the average of the available 
estimates in the ILO database. As they themselves argue, this data is not ideal since the underlying 
data may be of bad quality and contain similar problems as pure official statistics on trafficking. This 
variable only contains data from 31 European countries so missing data may also be a problem. Due 
to the limits in all existing data on trafficking we include this dataset as a complement and argue that 
the results are more robust if they hold for both datasets. 
 
Our independent variable of main interest is Law, which measures the degree of slackness in the 
prostitution legislation. It is a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 3. The classification is done 
according to the well-known prostitution policy regimes outlined above whereby we group neo-
abolitionist countries together with prohibitionist countries. Countries where buying and/or selling 
sex is illegal are coded as 1. Countries where it is legal to buy and sell sex but where procuring (e.g. 
pimping and running a brothel) is illegal are coded as 2. Countries where it is legal to buy and sell sex, 
pimp or own a brothel are coded as 3. We have legal data on 46 European countries; in 18 of these 
prostitution is illegal, in 20 countries prostitution is legal but procuring is illegal, and in eight of the 
countries both prostitution and procuring are legal. In Table A1 in Appendix 1 these countries are 
listed. The categorization was constructed mainly using the 2003 Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. The countries are listed in 
Table A2 in the appendix. It should be noted that this categorization does not take law enforcement 
into account, nor the fact that the severity of the punishment differs between countries in the same 
category. 
 
To take into account the fact that laws are followed to different degrees in different countries and to 
control for how easy it is to be engaged in organized crime we include rule of law and heroin 
smuggling as controls. It has been demonstrated that organized crime groups often use the same 
routes and similar methods for trafficking people and narcotics (Schloenhardt 2001). Our rule of law 
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measure is from the World Bank Aggregate Governance Indicators. It is measured in units ranging 
from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better rule of law outcomes. It includes several 
indicators which measure if agents have confidence in the rules of society. These include perceptions 
of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability 
of contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an 
environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions 
and the extent to which property rights are protected. The data is an average of the indicator for the 
years 1996–2003. Data on drug seizures are from UNDOC. The data is mainly drawn from the 
Annual Reports Questionnaire and supplemented with Interpol and UNDOC Field Offices reports. 
Data is presented in kilogram equivalents (see UNDOC 2007). We use the data for heroin seizures. 
 
To take into consideration market characteristics likely to influence the profitability of trafficking we 
also control for GDP per capita and population. For GDP per capita and population we use the 
average for the 1996–2003 periods from the OECD World Development Indicators (2006). The link 
between migration and trafficking has been argued to be important (e.g. UNODC 2009) and we 
include immigrant share (UN 2006) in order to control for this. 
 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the variables of interest and Table 2 presents the pair-
wise correlations between the variables. The pair-wise correlations show that countries scoring higher 
on the trafficking index as well as on the estimated number of victims variable tend to have less 
harsh prostitution legislation. As expected, a large population is positively related to trafficking 
prevalence; this is also true for GDP per capita, although not statistically significantly. Surprisingly a 
higher score on the rule of law index is positively correlated with trafficking. Immigrant share is 
somewhat surprisingly negatively related with trafficking, while heroin smuggling is positively related 
to trafficking. We also see that the countries having less harsh prostitution laws are richer and that 
they tend to have more heroin smuggling and better rule of law. The high bivariate correlation 
between GDP per capita and rule of law should also be noted. 
 
 (Table 1 here) 
 (Table 2 here) 
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In line with our hypothesis, the descriptive statistics show that countries with harsher prostitution 
laws are less subjected to trafficking. In Table 3, each of the 39 countries are listed according to the 
combinations of legal regulation of prostitution and prevalence of trafficking (Trafficking). Among the 
13 countries where prostitution is illegal, only one scores High on trafficking prevalence (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), and no country in this group scores Very high. In the group of 18 countries where 
prostitution is legal but procuring is illegal, seven countries score High and two countries score Very 
high. Where both prostitution and procuring is legal (seven countries) two score High and four score 
Very high on trafficking prevalence. Although this give indicative evidence that supports the 
hypothesis there may be other factors correlated with both national legislation and trafficking, such 
as rule of law etc. as described above, and the rest of this section is therefore devoted to results from 
regression analyses whereby we control for such factors. 
 
(Table 3 here) 
 
5. Empirical framework and results 
Since our main dependent variable (Trafficking) is discrete and ordered, the estimations are preformed 
using ordered logit regressions: 
 
ii1i0i XβLawgTraffickin ε++β=
∗
 
 
Traffickingi* gives the unobserved prevalence of trafficking to country i. iLaw  is a categorical 
variable ranging from 1 to 3 with higher values indicating slacker prostitution legislation, and iX  is a 
vector of control variables including population size, GDP per capita, migration share, heroin 
seizures, and a measure of rule of law (see above). iε  is a normally distributed error term. The 
probability that country i get ranked as trafficking rank k is the probability that the unobserved 
prevalence of trafficking fall in between the cut-points µk-1 and µk. 
 
.5,...,1k),XLaw(obPr)kgTraffickin(obPr ki1i01ki =µ≤β+β<µ== −  
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The sign of the coefficients reveal the average direction of change in the value of the outcome 
caused by a positive change in an independent variable. For the Trafficking victim variable we run 
ordinary least squares regressions with the same explanatory variables as in the former case. 
 
In Table 4, Column 1, we see that Law is clearly related to Trafficking when we do not control for 
other factors.3 The coefficient implies that less harsh prostitution legislation implies a higher score 
on the Trafficking index. Although this is illuminating, we include control variables to see if the 
relation holds also when controlling for other variables that may affect trafficking. To increase 
transparency, we introduce the control variables in a stepwise fashion, starting with population (in 
column 2) – which may be an important confounding variable since it could be the case that larger 
countries attract larger groups of trafficked prostitutes.4
 
 Since larger groups tend to be more visible it 
may also be the case that trafficking is easier to detect in large countries. As we saw in the pair-wise 
correlations (Table 2) however, while trafficking is correlated with population size, population size is 
not statistically significantly correlated with the legal framework. Hence, when we only control for 
population in column 2 it is statistically significant and points in the expected direction but it does 
not alter the results of the law variable. The following columns show that, among the control 
variables, only population is statistically significant but that also this variable loses its statistical 
significance in the full model (column 6). Most notably, the Law variable retains its statistical 
significance in all specifications and its magnitude does not change significantly, implying that the 
relationship observed in the descriptive statistics is robust to the inclusion of possibly confounding 
variables. We now turn to the size of the effects. If a country goes from a situation where buying 
and/or selling sex is illegal to a situation where prostitution is legal and regulated (from 1 to 3 on the 
Law variable), the probability that it will score High or Very high on the trafficking index increases by 
68 percent (62 percent in Specification 2). Thus, the empirical analysis clearly supports our 
theoretical predictions. 
(Table 4 here) 
 
Allowing for nonlinear effects from the Law variable by including dummies indicating if prostitution 
is fully legal and regulated and if it is illegal as compared to the situation where procuring is illegal, 
                                                 
3 The significance levels and size of effects are robust to the exclusion of countries that changed legislation during our 
period of study (Hungary, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and Sweden, see Appendix 2). 
4 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility. 
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shows that in countries where prostitution is legal and regulated, trafficking is much more prevalent 
than in countries where procuring is illegal. The difference between countries where prostitution is 
illegal and countries where only procuring is illegal is small and statistically insignificant.5
 
 This 
indicates that it is not the move to criminalize buying and/or selling that is crucial for lowering 
trafficking to a country, but the decision to make procuring illegal. 
Running OLS regressions with the same specifications as above but instead using the Trafficking victim 
variable as the dependent variable, we see that the results are similar (Table 5). In contrast to before, 
population now also has a statistically significant positive effect on the number of trafficking victims 
in the full model (column 6). We use the total number of victims since that this what we are 
interested in and it allows comparison with our previous results. It should be noted, though, that 
when the number of trafficked victims are expressed as a fraction of total population and population 
is not used as an explanatory variable, the result is only statistically significant at the 12 percent level.6
 
 
In sum, these results point in the direction of that harsher prostitution legislation is correlated with 
lower levels of trafficking. However, as we have discussed in previous sections, the data is 
problematic in several ways so we must be careful in interpreting these findings. 
  (Table 5 here) 
 
6. Case studies 
So far we have shown that our theoretical predictions have empirical support. Since the data is cross-
sectional, however, we are not able to conclude that changes in laws cause changes in trafficking 
flows, merely that they are statistically correlated when controlling for other relevant factors. 
Unfortunately, no longitudinal data exist on trafficking flows, but in this section we will strengthen 
the possibility of a causal relationship by looking at two European cases where prostitution law has 
been made harsher (Sweden and Norway). If our theoretical predictions are correct, trafficking 
should be reduced after the criminalization of buying sex. 
 
In Sweden, it has been illegal to buy sex, but not to sell it, since 1999. According to the Swedish 
government, trafficking was reduced following this criminalization (Friesendorf 2007).  Ekberg 
                                                 
5 These results are available upon request. 
6 These results are available upon request. 
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(2006) argues that the Swedish law decreased the demand for buying sex and thereby made the 
Swedish market less lucrative for traffickers. She has interviewed, among others, the Director for the 
anti-trafficking group at the Swedish Police and leading Swedish scholars and concludes that the 
number of women involved in street prostitution has declined by between 30 and 50 percent and the 
number of buyers decreased by as much as 75  to 80 percent between the year the law was passed 
and 2006 when she wrote her article. In a recent survey, Kousmanen (2010) find that some Swedish 
sex buyers claim that they have stopped buying sex or reduced the amount bought as a result of the 
criminalization. 
 
 Ekberg (2006) also refers to police reports and to the NetSex project at the University of 
Gothenburg, arguing that the number of people selling sex on the Internet is a stable figure and that 
it has not increased as in other countries. Danna (2007), however, notes that there has been an 
increase in the number of people selling sex on the Internet: in 2003 the figure was 80–100 persons; 
in 2005 the figure was 200–250 persons. This increase took place, though, several years after the 
passing of the Swedish law and it is hard to assess these numbers without comparison with other 
countries, as an upward trend in sex advertising on the Internet could be expected in most developed 
countries as a result of increased Internet traffic in general. Furthermore, Danna (2007) cites findings 
indicating considerable decreases in Stockholm street prostitution from the year before the reform to 
the year after – a decrease from 280 in 1998 to 170 in 1999 – and this number has been stable since. 
Based on this it is highly plausible that the quantity of prostitution decreased in Sweden in the years 
after the passing of the law, but there seems to have been a later increase in the amount of Internet 
sex advertising. 
 
The prostitution group in Stockholm argues in their evaluation that there were almost no foreign 
women seen in street prostitution in 2001 and the National Rapporteur for Trafficking in Women in 
Sweden writes in her reports from 2003 and 2004 that it is clear that the law has limited the amount 
of trafficking to Sweden (Ekberg 2006).  
 
The Swedish case thus seems to support the claim of a causal link from law to reduced trafficking. 
Furthermore, there are indications that traffickers consider the legal rules surrounding prostitution 
when choosing destination countries. For instance, Swedish police investigations using taped phone 
conversations show that traffickers have problems due to the Swedish law which criminalizes buying 
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sex since; i) time is lost because street prostitution is not viable; ii) Swedish men fear being arrested 
which requires a lot of (costly) discretion; iii) to avoid detection, several apartment brothels have to 
be used; this is costly and often requires more local contacts. Furthermore, victim testimonies have 
shown that traffickers prefer to operate in countries where prostitution is tolerated or legalized and 
the Latvian police have concluded that Latvian traffickers avoid Sweden due to the effect the 
Swedish law has on the profitability of their business (Ekberg 2006). 
 
In 2009, Norway followed the example of its Nordic neighbor and went from a situation where it 
was legal to both buy and sell sex to making buying illegal. Our theoretical prediction implies that 
trafficking should be reduced by this and we would expect the same mechanisms as in Sweden. Since 
the passage of the Norwegian law, street prostitution has declined, especially in Oslo and there has 
not been a reported increase in the indoor market (Strøm 2009). 
 
In a recent evaluation of the Norwegian criminalization of buying sex in the second largest 
Norwegian municipality (Bergen), the prevalence of street prostitution decreased considerably during 
the six months after the implementation of the law. In addition, escort Internet advertising decreased 
and no new public arenas for prostitution were found. Regarding trafficking, there was an increase in 
cases for the national ROSA project concerning forced labor, but a decrease in cases concerning 
trafficking for sexual exploitation (Bergen kommune 2010). Hence, the Norwegian case study 
indicates that prostitution has diminished in Norway. Thereby the profitability of trafficking to 
Norway should be reduced. 
 
These two case studies point in the same direction as the quantitative analysis: countries that 
implement harsher laws regarding prostitution seem to get a lower prevalence of trafficking. 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion  
Acknowledging that trafficking for sexual exploitation is an economic activity driven by profit 
motives and that state action or inaction is decisive for structuring profit possibilities, we develop 
theoretical predictions. Most importantly, we propose that slacker prostitution laws make it more 
profitable to traffic persons to a country and that the amount of trafficking will rise accordingly. 
Using cross country data we find clear support for our theoretical predictions: trafficking of persons 
for commercial sexual exploitation is least prevalent in countries where prostitution is illegal, most 
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prevalent in countries where prostitution is legalized, and in between in those countries where 
prostitution is legal but procuring illegal. We then proceed to look at case studies of countries that 
have changed prostitution laws in order to shed light on the possible causal mechanisms. More 
specifically, we look at Sweden and Norway, which have both introduced harsher laws, and, as 
predicted, trafficking seems to have been reduced in these countries. This study thus suggests that 
harsher prostitution legislation may reduce the amount of trafficking to a country. It should though 
be noted that we investigate the quantity of trafficking (as expressed by imperfect data) and not the 
total welfare consequences of the law. As suggested in the introduction, harsher prostitution laws 
may not only lead to decreased quantities but also to increased violence and other related criminality, 
as well as increased stigmatization for women working in these markets. When considering the best 
legal structure surrounding the market for prostitution and trafficking, all these aspects should be 
taken into account. We strongly urge future research to investigate these issues further.  
 
Another important step would be to investigate the mechanisms in the sending countries of this 
market which would enlighten the ongoing debate and policy process in the attempts to reduce 
human trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation. It is likely that factors such as poverty, 
inequality, and the social and economic marginalization of women play a significant role. That people 
have to escape and that immigration is not free probably also facilitate the existence of profiteers 
from trafficking.  
 
Finally, it should be noted once again that the data quality on international human trafficking is far 
from perfect and we strongly recommend more data collection. We argue, however, that since both 
our cross-country analyses with different data sets and the case studies point in the same direction, 
and since the results are supported by theoretical reasoning and the mechanisms found in the case 
studies, the results presented in this paper should be taken seriously. 
 
Even though the data is problematic, as long as there is no systematic bias, measurement error only 
biases the coefficients toward zero, implying that it should be even harder to find an effect. We have 
argued that the UNDOC data on occasions of trafficking cases may be systematically biased since 
larger countries may attract larger groups of trafficked women and, hence, they may be easier to 
detect. On the other hand, since the UNDOC data does not contain the number of victims, the 
degree of trafficking to larger countries may be underestimated if there are larger groups in those 
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countries. We have noted that population size is indeed correlated with trafficking but not with the 
legal framework surrounding prostitution, and controlling for population in a regression framework 
does not alter the effect of the Law variable. Using the Trafficking Victims data from the ILO and 
taking the trafficking victims per capita as dependent variable, however, reduces the statistical 
significance of the Law variable. A possible explanation for this finding may be that larger countries 
have more trafficking victims but not more trafficking victims per capita. Again, future research 
should investigate this hypothesis further. Another systematic bias could be that trafficking becomes 
harder to detect if prostitution becomes less visible due to legal changes. Even though we find no 
indications of an upsurge of hidden prostitution in our case studies, the very fact that it may be (very 
well) hidden so that it is not detected by anyone except the potential buyers implies that we cannot 
rule out this possibility. Our theoretical point is simply that traffickers would not choose to operate 
in such a setting when other settings are available and that increased costs reduce the quantity sold. 
Further research is definitely needed for robust causal inference, but the results in this paper point in 
the direction of less trafficking in countries with harsher prostitution laws. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Mean St. Err Min Max Obs. 
Trafficking 3.308      1.104 1 5 39 
Trafficking victim 4195.476 7647.392 0 32833.330 31 
Law 1.872 0.695 1 3 39 
Population (million) 20.203  30.090 0.278 146.300 39 
GDP per capita (thousands) 17.241 11.172 1.383 51.444 38 
Rule of law 0.709 1.008 -1.139 1.960 39 
Immigrant share 9.026 7.089 0.6      37.4 39 
Heroin (kilos) 429.013 1060.085 0.001 6160.257 39 
 
Table 2. Pair-wise correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Trafficking 1.000        
2 Trafficking victim 0.573*** 1.000       
3 Law 0.499*** 0.520*** 1.000      
4 Population 0.333** 0.360** 0.054 1.000     
5 GDP per capita 0.266 0.322* 0.431*** -0.081 1.000    
6 Rule of law 0.350** 0.317* 0.557*** -0.124 0.892*** 1.000   
7 Immigrant share -0.059 0.147 -0.100 -0.180 0.540*** 0.260* 1.000  
8 Heroin 0.403** 0.161 0.336** 0.495*** -0.073 -0.036 0.247 1.000 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 3. Legal framework and trafficking prevalence 
 
Prostitution 
illegal 
Only 
procuring 
illegal 
Prostitution 
legal and 
regulated 
Very low 1 2 0 
Low 2 2 0 
Medium 8 7 1 
High 1 7 2 
Very high 0 2 4 
Number of countries with each combination of legal 
framework and trafficking prevalence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Ordered logit. Trafficking as dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 No controls Population GDP Rule of law Heroin Full model 
       
Law 1.660*** 1.794*** 1.758*** 1.564** 1.687*** 1.456** 
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 (0.501) (0.527) (0.591) (0.615) (0.640) (0.680) 
Population  0.0250** 0.0253** 0.0291** 0.0270** 0.0193 
  (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0136) 
GDP   0.00834 -0.0596 -0.00370 -0.00940 
   (0.0348) (0.0607) (0.0747) (0.0748) 
Rule of law    0.967 0.519 0.590 
    (0.791) (0.863) (0.871) 
Immigrant share     -0.0678 -0.0544 
     (0.0579) (0.0587) 
Heroin      0.000635 
      (0.000699) 
Observations 39 39 38 38 38 38 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 5. OLS regressions. Trafficking victim as dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 No controls Population GDP Rule of law Heroin Full model 
       
Law 5.410*** 5.144*** 4.589** 4.562** 4.573** 6.092** 
 (1.651) (1.563) (1.969) (2.114) (2.164) (2.432) 
Population  75.32** 78.26** 78.87* 78.83* 107.6** 
  (35.29) (36.69) (40.37) (41.20) (46.23) 
GDP   86.91 70.90 75.24 -14.83 
   (150.6) (426.2) (440.9) (440.1) 
Rule of law    181.2 164.2 545.6 
    (4.496) (4.597) (4.542) 
Immigrant share     -14.26 -103.0 
     (237.1) (243.5) 
Heroin      -1.823 
      (1.400) 
Constant -5.753* -7.092** -7.631** -7.462 -7.423 -8.031 
 (3.262) (3.142) (3.418) (5.455) (5.604) (5.544) 
Observations 31 31 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.270 0.372 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.418 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 
Table A1. Trafficking inflow to European countries 
Very low Low Medium High Very high 
Georgia Ireland Albania Austria Belgium 
Moldova Luxembourg Bulgaria Bosnia and Herzegovina Germany 
Slovakia Romania Croatia Cyprus Greece 
 Slovenia Estonia Czech Republic Italy 
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  Finland Denmark Netherlands 
  Hungary France Turkey 
  Iceland Poland  
  Latvia Spain  
  Lithuania Switzerland  
  Macedonia United Kingdom 
  Norway   
  Portugal   
  Russia   
  Serbia and Montenegro   
  Sweden   
  Ukraine   
Source: UNDOC (2006) 
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Table A2. Prostitution legislation in European countries 
Illegal Procuring illegal Legal and regulated 
Albania Armenia Austria 
Andorra Azerbaijan Germany 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Belgium Greece 
Belarus Bulgaria Hungary 
Croatia Cyprus Netherlands 
Liechtenstein Czech Republic Switzerland 
Lithuania Denmark Turkey 
Macedonia Estonia  
Malta Finland  
Moldova France 
 
Romania Georgia 
Russia Iceland 
Serbia and Montenegro Ireland  
Slovenia Italy 
 Sweden Latvia 
Ukraine Luxembourg 
  Monaco 
 Norway  
 Poland  
 Portugal  
 Slovakia  
 Spain  
  United Kingdom 
Source: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (1996-2007). 
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Table A3. Variable description 
Variable Description Source 
Trafficking Categorical variable that ranges from 1 for Very low to 5 for Very high. The latter 
implies a high prevalence of trafficking to the country. 
UNDOC 
(2006) 
Trafficking 
victim 
Estimation of number of trafficking victims into a country. ILO (2006) 
Law Categorical variable where 1 implies it is illegal to buy and/or sell sex; 2 that 
prostitution is legal but procuring is illegal; and 3 that prostitution and procuring is 
legal. 
See 
Appendix 2 
Population Population in thousands. Average from 1996-2003.  WDI (2006) 
GDP GDP per capita in thousands. PPP (constant 2000 US$). Average from 1996-2003. WDI (2006) 
Rule of law Ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better rule of law 
outcomes. Average from 1996-2003. 
AGI (2009) 
Immigrant 
share 
The migrant stock as share of total population in 2005. UN (2006) 
Heroin Number of kilograms heroin seizures on average per year 2000-2005. UNDOC 
(2007) 
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Appendix 2 
The Law variable was constructed mainly using the 1996 to 2003 Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. For a few countries the report 
from 2003 did not include information on prostitution legislation (Andorra, Belarus, Estonia, 
Finland, Hungary, Luxemburg, and Macedonia). For these countries the report from 2007 was used 
instead. Since this information is from four years after the period we are interested in we 
complemented this information with other sources. For Andorra we used the 2005 report and found 
no information in other sources of a legal change in the years from 1996 to 2003. For Belarus, 
Estonia, Finland, and Macedonia, (Ditmore 2006) confirms the former finding; this is also true for 
Luxemburg (European Parliament 2004). 
 
Some of the countries also changed their legislation during the investigated period (1996–2003). In 
Hungary, prostitution became legalized and regulated in 2000, but prostitution had not been seen as 
a crime since 1993 (Gorondi 2007). In Denmark, prostitution (but not procuring) became legal in 
1999 (European Parliament 2004). In Sweden it became a criminal offence to buy, but not to sell, sex 
in 1999 (Proposition 1997/98:55). Before 1999, Sweden belonged to the category where procuring is 
illegal. In 2000 the Netherlands legalized prostitution; before this, procuring was generally illegal but 
many municipalities adopted a regulatory policy even before 2000 (European Parliament 2005). In 
Germany, prostitution became a legitimate form of employment in 2002, but it had been legalized 
(and only somewhat restricted) several years before (Raymond 2004). 
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